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a b s t r a c t
Given an instance I of the classical Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete preference
lists (smi), a maximum cardinality matching can be larger than a stable matching. In many
large-scale applications of smi, we seek tomatch asmany agents as possible. Thismotivates
the problem of finding a maximum cardinality matching in I that admits the smallest
number of blocking pairs (so is ‘‘as stable as possible’’). We show that this problem is NP-
hard and not approximable within n1−ε , for any ε > 0, unless P = NP, where n is the
number ofmen in I . Further, even if all preference lists are of length atmost 3, we show that
the problem remains NP-hard and not approximable within δ, for some δ > 1. By contrast,
we give a polynomial-time algorithm for the case where the preference lists of one sex are
of length at most 2.We also extend these results to the cases where (i) preference lists may
include ties, and (ii) we seek tominimize the number of agents involved in a blocking pair.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The Stable Marriage problem (sm) was introduced in the seminal paper of Gale and Shapley [6]. In its classical form,
an instance of sm involves n men and n women (whom we collectively refer to as the agents), each of whom specifies a
preference list, which is a total order on the members of the opposite sex. Amatching M is a set of (man, woman) pairs such
that each agent belongs to exactly one pair. If (m, w) ∈ M , we say that w is m’s partner inM , and vice versa, and we write
M(m) = w,M(w) = m.
An agent x prefers y to y′ if y precedes y′ on x’s preference list. AmatchingM is stable if it admits no blocking pair, namely a
(man, woman) pair (m, w) such thatm prefersw toM(m) andw prefersm toM(w). Gale and Shapley [6] proved that every
instance of sm admits at least one stable matching, and described an algorithm – the Gale/Shapley algorithm – that finds
such amatching in time that is linear in the input size. In general, theremay bemany stablematchings (in fact exponentially
many in n) for a given instance of sm [13].
Incomplete lists. A variety of extensions of the basic problem have been studied. In the Stable Marriage problem with
Incomplete lists (smi), the numbers of men and women need not be the same, and each agent’s preference list consists
of a subset of the members of the opposite sex in strict order. A (man, woman) pair (m, w) is acceptable if each member
of the pair appears on the preference list of the other. A matching M is now a set of acceptable pairs such that each agent
belongs to at most one pair. In this context, (m, w) is a blocking pair for a matching M if (a) (m, w) is an acceptable pair,
(b) m is either unmatched or prefers w to M(m), and likewise (c) w is either unmatched or prefers m to M(w). Given the
definitions of a matching and a blocking pair, we lose no generality by assuming that the preference lists are consistent (i.e.,
given a (man, woman) pair (m, w), m appears on the preference list of w if and only if w appears on the preference list of
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m). As in the classical case, there is always at least one stable matching for an instance of smi, and it is straightforward to
extend the Gale/Shapley algorithm to give a linear-time algorithm for this case. Again, there may be many different stable
matchings, but Gale and Sotomayor [7] showed that every stable matching for a given smi instance has the same size and
matches exactly the same set of agents.
Motivation. TheHospitals/Residents problem (hr) is amany-to-one generalization of smi, so called because of its applications
in centralized matching schemes that handle the allocation of graduating medical students, or residents, to hospitals [21].
The largest such scheme is the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) [26] in the US, but similar schemes exist in
Canada [27], in Scotland [12,28], and in a variety of other countries and contexts.
In the 2006–07 run of the Scottish medical matching scheme, called the Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme (SFAS),
there were 781 students and 53 hospitals, with total capacity 789. The matching algorithm (designed and implemented at
the Department of Computing Science, University of Glasgow) found a stable matching of size 744, thus leaving 37 students
unmatched. Clearly stability is the key property to be satisfied, and it is this that restricts the size of the resultant matching.
Nevertheless the administrators asked whether, were the stability criterion to have been relaxed, a larger matching could
have been found. We found that a matching of size 781 did exist, but the matching we computed admitted 400 blocking
pairs.
‘‘Almost stable’’ maximum matchings. In practical situations, a blocking pair of a given matching M need not always lead to
M being undermined, since the agents involved might be unaware of their potential to improve relative toM . For example,
in situations where preference lists are not public knowledge, there may be limited channels of communication that would
lead to the awareness of blocking pairs in practice. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assert that the greater the number
of blocking pairs of a given matching M , the greater the likelihood that M would be undermined by a pair of agents in
practice. In particular, a maximum cardinality matching (henceforth a maximummatching) for the 2006–07 SFAS data that
admits only 10 blocking pairs might be considered to be ‘‘more stable’’ than one with 400 blocking pairs. This motivates the
problem of finding a maximum matching that admits the smallest number of blocking pairs (and is therefore, in the sense
described above, ‘‘as stable as possible’’). Eriksson and Häggström [5] also argue that counting the number of blocking pairs
of a matching can be an effective way to measure its degree of instability; earlier, this approach had already been taken by
Khuller et al. [15]. An alternative approach is to count the number of agents who are involved in a blocking pair [24,5].
Further applications. Further practical applications of ‘‘almost stable’’ maximummatchings arise in similar bipartite settings,
where the size of the matching may be considered to be a higher priority than its stability in a particular matching market.
Examples include school placement [1] and the allocation of students to projects in a university department [3]. Furthermore,
the US Navy has a bipartite matching problem involving the assignment of sailors to billets [19,25] in which every sailor
should be matched to a billet, and meanwhile there are some critical billets that cannot be left vacant.
In non-bipartite contexts, applications arise in kidney exchange settings [22,29], for example. Here, both the size and
the stability of a matching have been considered as being the most important criteria. Centralized programs have been
organized in many countries to match incompatible patient–donor pairs, including the US, the Netherlands and the UK.
In most programs, the main goal is to maximize the number of transplants (i.e., the first priority is to find a maximum
matching) [22]. However other studies [23] consider stability as the first priority. Another example in a non-bipartite setting
involves pairing up chess players [16].
Our results. In this paperwepresent a range of algorithmic results for twoproblems, namelymax sizemin bp smi andmax size
min ba smi.max size min bp smi (respectivelymax size min ba smi) is the problem of finding a maximummatching with the
smallest number of blocking pairs (respectively blocking agents), given an instance of smi, where an agent is blocking if he/she
is amember of at least one blocking pair. We firstly show in Section 2 that both problems are NP-hard and not approximable
within n1−ε , for any ε > 0, unless P = NP. We then consider special cases of the problems where the preference lists on
one or both sides are short (this is motivated in practice by applications such as SFAS, where students are asked to rank
six hospitals in order of preference). We show in Section 3 that, even when preference lists on both sides are of length at
most 3, each of max size min bp smi and max size min ba smi is NP-hard and not approximable within δ, for some δ > 1,
unless P= NP. On the other hand, for the case where the lists on one side are of length at most 2 (and the lists on the other
side are unbounded in length), in Section 4, we give a polynomial-time algorithm for max size min bp smi. We show how
to modify this algorithm to the case where preference lists may include ties and/or we wish to find a maximum matching
with the minimum number of blocking agents, rather than blocking pairs. We remark that ties arise naturally in practice:
for example a large hospital with many applicants may be indifferent between those in certain groups. Finally, Section 5
contains concluding remarks.
Related work. Matchings with few blocking pairs have previously been studied from an algorithmic point of view in the
context of the Stable Roommates problem (sr), a non-bipartite generalization of sm, as a means of coping with the fact that,
in contrast to the case for sm, an sr instance need not admit a stable matching. Abraham et al. [2] showed that, given an sr
instance, the problem of finding a matching with the smallest number of blocking pairs is NP-hard and not approximable
within n1/2−ε , for any ε > 0, unless P=NP. In the case that preference lists include ties, the lower boundwas strengthened to
n1−ε . On the other hand, given a fixed integer K , they showed that the problem of finding amatchingwith exactly K blocking
pairs, or reporting that no such matching exists, is solvable in polynomial time. This paper can be viewed as a counterpart
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U = (∪n1i=1Ui) ∪ (∪{ui,wj}∈EGi,j) ∪ (∪n2i=1Vi) ∪ X
W = (∪n2j=1Wj) ∪ (∪{ui,wj}∈EHi,j) ∪ (∪n1j=1Zj) ∪ Y
Gi,j = G1i,j ∪ G2i,j ({ui, wj} ∈ E)
Gdi,j = {gc,di,j : 1 ≤ c ≤ C} ({ui, wj} ∈ E ∧ 1 ≤ d ≤ 2)
Hi,j = H1i,j ∪ H2i,j ({ui, wj} ∈ E)
Hdi,j = {hc,di,j : 1 ≤ c ≤ C} ({ui, wj} ∈ E ∧ 1 ≤ d ≤ 2)
Ui = {u1i , u2i , u3i } (1 ≤ i ≤ n1)
Vi = {v1i , v2i , v3i } (1 ≤ i ≤ n2)
Wj = {w1j , w2j , w3j , w4j } (1 ≤ j ≤ n2)
X = {xi : 1 ≤ i ≤ n2 − K}
Y = {yj : 1 ≤ j ≤ n1 − K}
Zj = {z1j , z2j } (1 ≤ j ≤ n1).
Fig. 1.Men and women in the constructed instance of max size min bp smi.
of [2], strengthening its results by moving to the bipartite setting, and answering the remaining previously open questions
in a table shown in Section 5.
Finally, we note that in a recent paper [9], Hamada et al. studied a related problem forhrwhere hospitalsmay have lower
quotas (besides the usual upper quotas). In their model each applicant has a complete preference list (i.e., the underlying
bipartite graph is complete) and the number of residents is at least the sum of the lower quotas. Thus a feasible matching, in
which each hospital is assigned a number of residents no smaller than its lower bound, and no larger than its upper bound,
is guaranteed to exist. They showed that the problem of finding a feasible matching with the minimum number of blocking
pairs is not approximable within n1−ε , for any positive constant ε, where n is the total number of hospitals and residents.
2. Unbounded length preference lists
Before presenting the main result of this section, we define some notation and terminology relating to matchings
and graphs. Given an instance I of smi, let M denote the set of matchings in I and let M+ denote the set of maximum
matchings in I . Given a matchingM ∈ M, let bp(I,M) (respectively ba(I,M)) denote the set of blocking pairs (respectively
blocking agents) with respect toM in I (we omit the first item I when the instance is clear from the context). Let bp+(I) =
min{|bp(I,M)| : M ∈ M+} and let ba+(I) = min{|ba(I,M)| : M ∈ M+}. Define max size min bp smi (respectively max
size min ba smi) to be the problem of finding, given an smi instance I , a matching M ∈ M+ such that |bp(I,M)| = bp+(I)
(respectively |ba(I,M)| = ba+(I)).
Given a graph G, the subdivision graph of G, denoted by S(G), is a bipartite graph obtained by subdividing each edge {u, w}
of G in order to obtain two edges {u, v} and {v,w} of S(G), where v is a new vertex. A matchingM in a graph G is said to be
maximal if no proper superset ofM is a matching in G. Let β(G) denote the size of a maximummatching in G. Define exact-
mm to be the problem of deciding, given a graph G and integer K , whether G admits a maximal matching of size exactly K .
exact-mm is NP-complete, even for subdivision graphs of cubic graphs [18, Lemma 2.2.1].We nowpresent a gap-introducing
reduction from exact-mm to max size min bp smi.
Theorem 1. max size min bp smi is not approximable within n1−ε , where n is the number of men in a given instance, for any
ε > 0, unless P= NP.
Proof. Let ε > 0 be given. We transform from exact-mm restricted to subdivision graphs of cubic graphs, which is NP-
complete as noted above. Hence let G = (V , E) (a subdivision graph of some cubic graph G′) and K (a positive integer) be an
instance of exact-mm. Then G is a bipartite graph, and V is a disjoint union of two sets U andW , where each edge e ∈ E joins
a vertex in U to a vertex inW . Let m = |E|. We lose no generality by assuming that K ≤ β(G) ≤ min{|U|, |W |}. Suppose
that U = {u1, u2, . . . , un1} andW = {w1, w2, . . . , wn2}. Without loss of generality assume that each vertex in U has degree
2 and each vertex inW has degree 3. For each ui ∈ U , let wpi and wqi be the two neighbours of ui in G, where pi < qi. Also,
for eachwj ∈ W , let urj , usj and utj , be the three neighbours ofwj, where rj < sj < tj.
Let B = ⌈ 3
ε
⌉
and let C = (n1 + n2)B+1 − (n1 + n2) + 1. We create an instance I of smi as follows. The sets of
men and women in I are denoted by U and W respectively, where U and W are as defined in Fig. 1. It follows that
|U| = |W | = 3n1 + 4n2 + 2mC − K . Let U1 = {u1i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n1} and letW 1 = {w1j : 1 ≤ j ≤ n2}.
For each ui ∈ U andwj ∈ W such that {ui, wj} ∈ E, define σj,i = 1 ifwj = wpi and σj,i = 2 ifwj = wqi , and define τi,j = 1
if ui = urj , τi,j = 2 if ui = usj and τi,j = 3 if ui = utj . To illustrate this notation, let G′ be the cubic graph K4 with vertices
w1, . . . , w4, and let G = S(G′), where V (G)\V (G′) = {u1, . . . , u6}. Suppose that the two neighbours of u1 arewp1 = w1 and
wq1 = w2. Also suppose that the three neighbours of w1 are ur1 = u1, us1 = u2 and ut1 = u5. Then, relative to {u2, w1}, we
have σ1,2 = 1 (sincew1 = wp2 ) and τ2,1 = 2 (since u2 = us1 ).
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u1i : z1i w
τi,pi
pi [H1i,pi ] [H1i,qi ] [[Y ]] (1 ≤ i ≤ n1)
u2i : z2i w
τi,qi
qi (1 ≤ i ≤ n1)
u3i : z1i z2i (1 ≤ i ≤ n1)
gc,1i,j : hc,1i,j w1j hc,2i,j ({ui, wj} ∈ E ∧ 1 ≤ c ≤ C)
gc,2i,j : hc,2i,j hc,1i,j ({ui, wj} ∈ E ∧ 1 ≤ c ≤ C)
v1i : w1i w4i (1 ≤ i ≤ n2)
v2i : w2i w4i (1 ≤ i ≤ n2)
v3i : w3i w4i (1 ≤ i ≤ n2)
xi : [[W 1]] (1 ≤ i ≤ n2 − K)
w1j : v1j u
σj,rj
rj [G1rj,j] [G1sj,j] [G1tj,j] [[X]] (1 ≤ j ≤ n2)
w2j : v2j u
σj,sj
sj (1 ≤ j ≤ n2)
w3j : v3j u
σj,tj
tj (1 ≤ j ≤ n2)
w4j : v1j v2j v3j (1 ≤ j ≤ n2)
hc,1i,j : gc,2i,j u1i gc,1i,j ({ui, wj} ∈ E ∧ 1 ≤ c ≤ C)
hc,2i,j : gc,1i,j gc,2i,j ({ui, wj} ∈ E ∧ 1 ≤ c ≤ C)
z1j : u1j u3j (1 ≤ j ≤ n1)
z2j : u2j u3j (1 ≤ j ≤ n1)
yj : [[U1]] (1 ≤ j ≤ n1 − K)
Fig. 2. Preference lists in the constructed instance of max size min bp smi.
Preference lists for the men and women in I are as shown in Fig. 2. In a given agent’s preference list, the symbol [S]
denotes all members of the set S listed in some arbitrary strict order at the point where the symbol appears, and the symbol
[[S]] denotes all members of S listed in increasing subscript order at the point where the symbol appears.
We now give some intuition behind this construction. Suppose that M is a maximal matching of size K in G. For each
{ui, wj} ∈ M , the relevant pair in Ui × Wj (who rank each other in second place) will be added to a matching M ′ in I . The
n1 − K men in U (respectively n2 − K women inW ) who are unmatched inM are collectively matched inM ′ to the women
in Y (respectively men in X). The remaining members of Ui (for each ui ∈ U) and Wj (for each wj ∈ W ) are collectively
matched inM ′ to the members of Zi and Vj respectively. Each of U × Zi and Vj ×W contributes one blocking pair toM ′. It is
then possible to extendM ′ to a perfect matching in I without introducing any additional blocking pairs by adding a perfect
matching between the members of Gi,j ∪ Hi,j for each {ui, wj} ∈ E. Hence |bp(M ′)| = n1 + n2. Conversely, from a perfect
matchingM ′ in I , it is straightforward to extract a matchingM in G of size K . IfM is not maximal then there is some ui ∈ U
and wj ∈ W , both unmatched in M , such that {ui, wj} ∈ E. In this case, for each c (1 ≤ c ≤ C), either (u1i , hc,1i,j ) ∈ bp(M ′)
or (gc,1i,j , w
1
j ) ∈ bp(M ′) (that is, the men and women in G1i,j ∪ H1i,j contribute to a huge number of blocking pairs ofM ′), and
hence |bp(M ′)| ≥ C . This introduces the required ‘gap’ for the inapproximability result.
To partially illustrate the construction, again consider the above example where G′ = K4 and G = S(G). Suppose, in
addition to the earlier assumptions, that {u2, w4} ∈ E(G), K = 3 and ε = 3. Then C = 91, since n1 = 6 and n2 = 4. A
selection of the preference lists in the instance I corresponding to G is shown in Fig. 3.
For the formal argument showing the correctness of the reduction, we firstly show that I admits a perfect matching. As
K ≤ β(G), it follows that G admits a matching M of size K . We form a matching M ′ in I as follows. Consider each edge
{ui, wj} ∈ E. Suppose firstly that {ui, wj} ∈ M , where ui ∈ U and wj ∈ W . Let σ = 1, 2 according as wj is wpi or wqi
respectively, and let τ = 1, 2, 3 according as ui is urj , usj or utj respectively. Add (uσi , wτj ), (u3−σi , z3−σi ) and (u3i , zσi ) to M ′.
Also, for each wcj ∈ {w1j , w2j , w3j }\{wτj }, add (vcj , wcj ) to M ′. Next add (vτj , w4j ) to M ′. Finally, for each c (1 ≤ c ≤ C), add
(gc,1i,j , h
c,1
i,j ) and (g
c,2
i,j , h
c,2
i,j ) toM
′. Now suppose that {ui, wj} /∈ M . If ui is matched inM , add (gc,1i,j , hc,1i,j ) and (gc,2i,j , hc,2i,j ) toM ′
for each c (1 ≤ c ≤ C). Otherwise add (gc,1i,j , hc,2i,j ) and (gc,2i,j , hc,1i,j ) to M ′ for each c (1 ≤ c ≤ C). There are n1 − K vertices
in U that are unmatched in M — denote these vertices by ua1 , ua2 , . . . , uan1−K , where a1 < a2 < · · · < an1−K . Add (u1ai , yi),
(u2ai , z
2
ai) and (u
3
ai , z
1
ai) toM
′ (1 ≤ i ≤ n1−K ). Similarly there remain n2−K vertices inW that are unmatched inM — denote
these vertices by wb1 , wb2 , · · · , wbn2−K , where b1 < b2 < . . . < bn2−K . Add (xj, w1bj), (v2bj , w2bj), (v3bj , w3bj) and (v1bj , w4bj) to
M ′ (1 ≤ j ≤ n2 − K ). It may be verified thatM ′ is a perfect matching in I .
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u12 : z12 w21 [H12,1] [H12,4] y1 y2 y3
u22 : z22 w14
u32 : z12 z22
gc,12,1 : hc,12,1 w11 hc,22,1 (1 ≤ c ≤ 91)
gc,22,1 : hc,22,1 hc,12,1 (1 ≤ c ≤ 91)
v11 : w11 w41
v21 : w21 w41
v31 : w31 w41
x1 : w11 w12 w13 w14
w11 : v11 u11 [G11,1] [G12,1] [G15,1] x1
w21 : v21 u12
w31 : v31 u15
w41 : v11 v21 v31
hc,12,1 : gc,22,1 u12 gc,12,1 (1 ≤ c ≤ 91)
hc,22,1 : gc,12,1 gc,22,1 (1 ≤ c ≤ 91)
z12 : u12 u32
z22 : u22 u32
yj : u11 u12 u13 u14 u15 u16 (1 ≤ j ≤ 3)
Fig. 3. Selected preference lists in an example instance of max size min bp smi.
We now show that if G admits a maximal matching of size K , then bp(I) ≤ n1+n2. For, suppose that G admits a maximal
matchingM of size K . As above, we form a perfectmatchingM ′ in I .We now show that |bp(M ′)| = n1+n2. For, let 1 ≤ i ≤ n1
be given. Exactly one of (u1i , z
1
i ), (u
2
i , z
2
i ) belongs to bp(M
′). Now suppose that (u1i , yb) ∈ M ′ for some yb ∈ Y . Then ui is
unmatched inM , so that by themaximality ofM in G, each ofwpi andwqi is matched inM . Hence any h
c,d
i,j whom u
1
i prefers to
yb is matched inM ′ to her first-choice partner, so that (u1i , h
c,d
i,j ) /∈ bp(M ′). Similarlyw
τi,pi
pi is matched inM
′ to her first-choice
partner, so that (u1i , w
τi,pi
pi ) /∈ bp(M ′). Also (u1i , yb′) /∈ bp(M ′) for any yb′ ∈ Y , for otherwise b′ < b. But by construction of
M ′, it follows that (u1i′ , yb′) ∈ M ′ for some i′ < i, and hence yb′ prefers u1i′ to u1i , a contradiction.
Now let {ui, wj} ∈ E. It is straightforward to verify that no pair of the form (gc,di,j , hc,d
′
i,j ) (1 ≤ c ≤ C , 1 ≤ d, d′ ≤ 2) is in
bp(M ′). Now let 1 ≤ i ≤ n2. Exactly one of (v1i , w1i ), (v2i , w2i ), (v3i , w3i ) belongs to bp(M ′). Finally let 1 ≤ i ≤ n2 − K and
suppose that (xi, w1j ) ∈ M ′. For any j′ < j, eitherw1j′ is matched inM ′ to her first or second-choice partner, or (xi′ , w1j′) ∈ M ′.
In the latter case i′ < i, so that (xi, w1j′) /∈ bp(M ′). Hence |bp(M ′)| = n1 + n2 as claimed.
We next show that if G admits no maximal matching of size K then bp(I) > (n1 + n2)B+1. Suppose that G admits no
maximal matching of size K . LetM ′ be an arbitrary perfect matching in I . We claim that |bp(M ′)| > (n1 + n2)B+1. Firstly we
note that, for each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n1), u3i is matched inM ′ to some zbi (b = 1, 2), and thus (ubi , zbi ) ∈ bp(M ′). Similarly for each j
(1 ≤ j ≤ n2),w4j is matched inM ′ to some vaj (1 ≤ a ≤ 3), and thus (vaj , waj ) ∈ bp(M ′).
Now let
M =
{
{ui, wj} ∈ E : ((u
σ
i , w
τ
j ) ∈ M ′ where 1 ≤ σ ≤ 2 ∧ 1 ≤ τ ≤ 3) ∨
((u1i , h
c,1
i,j ) ∈ M ′ where 1 ≤ c ≤ C)
}
.
We claim that M is a matching in G. For if (u1i , w
b
j ) ∈ M ′ and (u2i , wb′j′ ) ∈ M ′ then either z1i or z2i is unmatched in M ′, a
contradiction. Similarly if (uai , w
b
j ) ∈ M ′ and (ua′i′ , wb
′
j ) ∈ M ′ for some b 6= b′ then at least one of v1j , v2j or v3j is unmatched
in M ′, a contradiction. Finally if (u1i , h
c,1
i,j ) ∈ M ′ for some u1i ∈ U and hc,1i,j ∈ H , then (gc,2i,j , hc,2i,j ) ∈ M ′, which in turn forces
(gc,1i,j , w
1
j ) ∈ M ′. Hence the claim is established.
Also |M| = K , for the n1−K members of Y are collectivelymatched inM ′ toU1Y ⊆ U1. Thus |U1\U1Y | = K . Let u1i ∈ U1\U1Y .
Either (u1i , w
b
j ) ∈ M ′ for some b (1 ≤ b ≤ 3) and j (1 ≤ j ≤ n2) or (u1i , z1i ) ∈ M ′. In the latter case (u2i , wbj ) ∈ M ′ for some b
(1 ≤ b ≤ 3) and j (1 ≤ j ≤ n2), for otherwise u3i is unmatched inM ′, a contradiction.
Finally by the hypothesis,M is not maximal in G. Hence there exists some {ui, wj} ∈ E such that no edge ofM is incident
to either ui or wj. By construction ofM it follows that (u2i , z
2
i ) ∈ M ′, which forces (u3i , z1i ) ∈ M ′ and (u1i , yb) ∈ M ′ for some
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yb ∈ Y . Similarly by construction of M it follows that (v2j , w2j ) ∈ M ′ and (v3j , w3j ) ∈ M ′, which forces (v1j , w4j ) ∈ M ′ and
(xa, w1j ) ∈ M ′ for some xa ∈ X . Now let c (1 ≤ c ≤ C) be given. If {(gc,1i,j , hc,1i,j ), (gc,2i,j , hc,2i,j )} ⊆ M ′ then (u1i , hc,1i,j ) ∈ bp(M ′).
Otherwise {(gc,1i,j , hc,2i,j ), (gc,2i,j , hc,1i,j )} ⊆ M ′, so that (gc,1i,j , w1j ) ∈ bp(M ′). Hence |bp(M ′)| ≥ n1 + n2 + C > (n1 + n2)B+1 as
claimed.
Hence the existence of an (n1 + n2)B-approximation algorithm for max size min bp smi implies a polynomial-time
algorithm for exact-mm in subdivision graphs of cubic graphs, a contradictionunless P=NP.We claim that (n1+n2)B ≥ n1−ε .
For, we firstly observe that n = 3n1 + 2mC + 4n2 − K . Now G is the subdivision graph of a cubic graph G′, and n1 is the
number of edges in G′, so 2n1 = 3n2. Alsom = 2n1. It follows that
n = 7n1 + 4n2 + 4n1(n1 + n2)B+1 − 4n1(n1 + n2)− K . (1)
From Eq. (1), we may deduce that n ≤ 3(n1 + n2)B+2, and hence
(n1 + n2)B ≥ 3− BB+2 n BB+2 . (2)
By hypothesis K ≤ min{n1, n2}, and without loss of generality we may assume that n1 ≥ 3; hence Eq. (1) also implies that
n ≥ 3B, and hence 3− BB+2 ≥ n− 1B+2 . But B+ 2 ≥ 3
ε
, and hence Inequality (2) implies that (n1 + n2)B ≥ n1−ε as required. 
Let max size exact bp smi denote the problem of finding, given an smi instance I and an integer K ′, a matchingM ∈M+
such that |bp(I,M)| = K ′.
Corollary 2. max size exact bp smi is NP-complete.
Proof. We use the same reduction as in the proof of Theorem 1 and set K ′ = n1 + n2 and ε = ∞ (i.e. B = 0 and C = 1). As
before G has a maximal matching of size K if and only if I admits a perfect matching M ′ such that |bp(M ′)| ≤ K ′. However
it is straightforward to verify that any perfect matchingM ′ in I satisfies |bp(M ′)| ≥ K ′, and hence the result follows. 
Given that smi is a special case of sr, we may reuse results from [2] to obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 3 ([2]). max size exact bp smi is solvable in polynomial time when K ′ is fixed.
We now consider max size min ba smi. It turns out that a small modification to the proof of Theorem 1 is sufficient to
establish the same inapproximability result for this problem.
Theorem 4. max size min ba smi is not approximable within n1−ε , where n is the number of men in a given instance, for any
ε > 0, unless P= NP.
Proof. We use the same reduction as in the proof of Theorem 1, with the single modification that we now set C =
2(n1 + n2)B+1 − 2(n1 + n2) + 1. Using a similar argument to that in the proof of Theorem 1, it follows that if G admits
a maximal matching of size K then I admits a perfect matchingM ′ such that |ba(M ′)| = 2(n1+ n2). Conversely if G does not
admit a maximal matching of size K then any perfect matchingM ′ in I satisfies |ba(M ′)| ≥ 2(n1+ n2)+ C > 2(n1+ n2)B+1.
Hence the existence of a (n1+n2)B-approximation algorithm formax sizemin ba smi implies a polynomial-time algorithm
for exact-mm in subdivision graphs of cubic graphs, a contradiction unless P= NP. We claim that (n1 + n2)B ≥ n1−ε . As in
the proof of Theorem 1, we firstly observe that
n = 7n1 + 4n2 + 8n1(n1 + n2)B+1 − 8n1(n1 + n2)− K . (3)
From Eq. (3), we may deduce that n ≤ 5(n1 + n2)B+2, and hence
(n1 + n2)B ≥ 5− BB+2 n BB+2 . (4)
By hypothesis K ≤ min{n1, n2}, and without loss of generality we may assume that n1 ≥ 3, and hence n1 + n2 ≥ 5 since
2n1 = 3n2. Thus Eq. (3) also implies that n ≥ 5B, and hence 5− BB+2 ≥ n− 1B+2 . But B+ 2 ≥ 3ε , and hence Inequality (4) implies
that (n1 + n2)B ≥ n1−ε as required. 
Let max size exact ba smi denote the problem of finding, given an smi instance I and an integer K ′, a matchingM ∈M+
such that |ba(I,M)| = K ′.
Corollary 5. max size exact ba smi is NP-complete.
Proof. We use the same reduction as in the proof of Theorem 1 and set K ′ = 2(n1 + n2) and ε = ∞ (i.e. B = 0 and C = 1).
As before G has amaximal matching of size K if and only if I admits a perfect matchingM ′ such that |ba(M ′)| ≤ K ′. However
it is straightforward to verify that any perfect matchingM ′ in I satisfies |ba(M ′)| ≥ K ′, and hence the result follows. 
We now turn to the case that K ′ is fixed in the definition of max size exact ba smi. In the following theorem, and in
Section 4, we use the following terminology. Let I be an smi instance in which U is the set of men and W is the set of
women. The underlying graph of I is a bipartite graph G = (V , E), where V = U∪W and E is the set of mutually acceptable
pairs.
1834 P. Biró et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 411 (2010) 1828–1841
x6i : y6i c(x6i) y6i+1 (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
x6i+1 : y6i+1 c(x6i+1) y6i+2 (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
x6i+2 : y6i+3 c(x6i+2) y6i+2 (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
x6i+3 : y6i+4 c(x6i+3) y6i+3 (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
x6i+4 : y6i+4 y6i+5 (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
x6i+5 : y6i y6i+5 (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
prj : wrj crj (1 ≤ j ≤ m ∧ 1 ≤ r ≤ 3)
vrj : wrj zj (1 ≤ j ≤ m ∧ 1 ≤ r ≤ 3)
qj : c1j c2j c3j (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
y6i : x6i+5 x6i (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
y6i+1 : x6i x6i+1 (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
y6i+2 : x6i+2 x6i+1 (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
y6i+3 : x6i+3 x6i+2 (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
y6i+4 : x6i+4 x6i+3 (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
y6i+5 : x6i+4 x6i+5 (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1)
crj : prj x(crj ) qj (1 ≤ j ≤ m ∧ 1 ≤ r ≤ 3)
wrj : vrj prj (1 ≤ j ≤ m ∧ 1 ≤ r ≤ 3)
zj : v1j v2j v3j (1 ≤ j ≤ m)
Fig. 4. Preference lists in the constructed instance of max size min bp (3, 3) -smi.
Theorem 6. max size exact ba smi is solvable in polynomial time when K ′ is fixed.
Proof. Let I be an instance of smiwith nmen and nwomen, and letm be the total length of themen’s preference lists in I . Let
G be the underlying graph of I . We generate the O(nK
′
) subsets of size K ′ of the agents in I . For each such subset S, we then
generate the edge covers of the subgraph of G induced by S; there are at most O(2K
′2
) such subsets. For each such edge cover
B we determine whether I admits a matching M satisfying bp(M) = B; this can be accomplished in O(m) time [2]. Such a
set of blocking pairs involves precisely the agents in S by construction. Overall this algorithm has O(mnK
′
) complexity. 
3. Preference lists of length at most 3
In this section we consider the case where preference lists in a given instance I of smi are of bounded length. Given two
integers p and q, let max size min bp (p, q)-smi (respectively max size min ba (p, q)-smi) denote the restriction of max size
min bp smi (respectively max size min ba smi) in which each man’s preference list is of length at most p, and each woman’s
list is of length at most q. We use p = ∞ or q = ∞ to denote the possibility that the men’s lists or women’s lists are of
unbounded length, respectively.
We begin by showing thatmax size min bp (3, 3)-smi is NP-hard and not approximable within some δ > 1 unless P=NP.
To prove this, we give a reduction from a restricted version of sat. Given a Boolean formula B in CNF and a truth assignment
f , let t(f ) denote the number of clauses of B satisfied simultaneously by f , and let t(B) denote the maximum value of t(f ),
taken over all truth assignments f of B. Letmax (2,2)-e3-sat [4] denote the problem of finding, given a Boolean formula B in
CNF in which each clause contains exactly 3 literals and each variable occurs exactly twice as an unnegated literal in B and
exactly twice as a negated literal in B, a truth assignment f such that t(f ) = t(B).
Theorem 7. Given any ε (0 < ε < 12032 ), max size min bp (3, 3)-smi is not approximable within
3557
3556+2032ε unless P= NP.
Proof. Let ε (0 < ε < 12032 ) be given. Let B be an instance of max (2,2)-e3-sat. Let V = {v0, v1, . . . , vn−1} and
C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} be the set of variables and clauses in B respectively. Then for each vi ∈ V , each of literals vi and v¯i
appears exactly twice in B. Also |cj| = 3 for each cj ∈ C .
We form an instance I of max size min bp smi as follows. The set of men in I is X ∪ P ∪ Q ∪ V and the set of women in I
is Y ∪ C ′ ∪W ∪ Z , where X = ∪n−1i=0 Xi, Xi = {x6i+r : 0 ≤ r ≤ 5} (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1), P = ∪mj=1Pj, Pj = {p1j , p2j , p3j } (1 ≤ j ≤ m),
Q = {qj : cj ∈ C}, V = ∪mj=1Vj, Vj = {v1j , v2j , v3j } (1 ≤ j ≤ m), Y = ∪n−1i=0 Yi, Yi = {y6i+r : 0 ≤ r ≤ 5} (0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1),
C ′ = {crj : cj ∈ C ∧ 1 ≤ r ≤ 3},W = ∪mj=1Wj,Wj = {w1j , w2j , w3j } (1 ≤ j ≤ m), and Z = {zj : cj ∈ C}.
The preference lists of the men and women in I are shown in Fig. 4. In the preference list of an agent x6i+r ∈ X
(0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 and r ∈ {0, 1}), the symbol c(x6i+r) denotes the woman csj ∈ C ′ such that the (r + 1)th occurrence of
vi appears at position s of cj. Similarly if r ∈ {2, 3} then the symbol c(x6i+r) denotes the woman csj ∈ C ′ such that the
(r − 1)th occurrence of v¯i appears at position s of cj. Also in the preference list of an agent csj ∈ C ′, if literal vi appears at
position s of clause cj ∈ C , the symbol x(csj ) denotes the man x6i+r−1 where r = 1, 2 according as this is the first or second
occurrence of literal vi in B, otherwise if literal v¯i appears at position s of clause cj ∈ C , the symbol x(csj ) denotes the man
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x24 : y24 c31 y25 y24 : x29 x24
x25 : y25 c24 y26 y25 : x24 x25
x26 : y27 c12 y26 y26 : x26 x25
x27 : y28 c37 y27 y27 : x27 x26
x28 : y28 y29 y28 : x28 x27
x29 : y24 y29 y29 : x28 x29
p31 : w31 c31 c31 : p31 x24 q1
v31 : w31 z1 w31 : v31 p31
q1 : c11 c21 c31 z1 : v11 v21 v31
Fig. 5. Selected preference lists in an example instance of max size min bp (3, 3)-smi.
x6i+r+1 where r = 1, 2 according as this is the first or second occurrence of literal v¯i in B. Clearly each preference list is of
length at most 3.
For each i (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1), let Ti = {(x6i+r , y6i+r) : 0 ≤ r ≤ 5} and Fi = {(x6i+r , y6i+r+1)} : 0 ≤ r ≤ 5}, where addition is
taken module 6i. We firstly note thatM is a perfect matching of the men and women in I , where
M =
n−1⋃
i=0
Ti ∪ {(p1j , c1j ), (v1j , w1j ), (p2j , c2j ), (v2j , w2j ), (qj, c3j ), (p3j , w3j ), (v3j , zj) : 1 ≤ j ≤ m}.
We now give some intuition behind this construction. The agents in Xi ∪ Yi correspond to variable vi ∈ V , whilst the
agents in Pj ∪ Vj ∪Wj ∪ {qj, c1j , c2j , c3j , zj} correspond to clause cj ∈ C . The pairs in Ti are added to a matchingM in I if vi ∈ V
is true under a truth assignment f of B, otherwise the pairs in Fi are added toM . Crucially, if vi is false under f then each of
x6i and x6i+1 (corresponding to the first and second occurrences of literal vi) has his third choice inM . Similarly if vi is true
under f then each of x6i+2 and x6i+3 (corresponding to the first and second occurrences of literal v¯i) has his third choice in
M . Hence if any clause cj is false under f , then since (qj, csj ) ∈ M for some s ∈ {1, 2, 3}, it follows that (x(csj ), csj ) ∈ bp(M).
Additionally, regardless of the truth values of V under f , the members of Xi×Yi contribute one blocking pair for each vi ∈ V ,
as do the members of Vj ×Wj for each cj ∈ C .
To partially illustrate the construction, let B be an instance ofmax (2,2)-e3-sat in which the first and second occurrences
of literal v4 are the third and second literals in c1 and c4 respectively, and in which the first and second occurrences of literal
v¯4 are the first and third literals in c2 and c7 respectively. A selection of the preference lists in the instance I corresponding
to G is shown in Fig. 5.
For the formal argument showing the correctness of the reduction, we claim that t(B)+ bp+(I) = n+ 2m.
For, let f be a truth assignment of B such that t(f ) = t(B). We create a perfect matching M in I as follows. For each
variable vi ∈ V , if vi is true under f , add the pairs in Ti to M , otherwise add the pairs in Fi to M . In the former case,
bp(M) ∩ (Xi × Yi) = {(x6i+5, y6i)}, whilst in the latter case, bp(M) ∩ (Xi × Yi) = {(x6i+4, y6i+4)}.
Now let cj ∈ C . If cj contains a literal that is true under f , let s ∈ {1, 2, 3} denote the position of cj in which this literal
occurs, otherwise set s = 1. Add the pairs (ptj , ctj ), (vtj , wtj ) (1 ≤ t 6= s ≤ 3), (qj, csj ), (psj , wsj ) and (vsj , zj) to M . Then
bp(M)∩ (Vj×Wj) = {(vsj , wsj )}. Now if cj is not satisfied under f then man x(c1j ) has his last-choice partner, by construction
of M . Hence (x(c1j ), c
1
j ) ∈ bp(M). Moreover these, together with the n + m blocking pairs in X × Y and V ×W identified
already, are all the blocking pairs ofM in I . Hence |bp(M)| = n+m+ (m− t(f )), i.e. bp+(I)+ t(B) ≤ n+ 2m.
Conversely suppose that I admits a perfect matchingM such that |bp(M)| = bp+(I). We form a truth assignment f in B
as follows. For each i (0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1), ifM ∩ (Xi × Yi) = Ti, set vi to be true under f . OtherwiseM ∩ (Xi × Yi) = Fi, in which
case we set vi to be false under f .
We next observe that if M ∩ (Xi × Yi) = Ti, then bp(M) ∩ (Xi × Yi) = {(x6i+5, y6i)}, whilst if M ∩ (Xi × Yi) = Fi,
then bp(M) ∩ (Xi × Yi) = {(x6i+4, y6i+4)}. For each j (1 ≤ j ≤ m), (qj, csj ) ∈ M for some s (1 ≤ s ≤ 3), so that
{(ptj , ctj ), (vtj , wtj )} ⊆ M for each t (1 ≤ t 6= s ≤ 3), whilst {(psj , wsj ), (vsj , zj)} ⊆ M , since M is a perfect matching. Hence
bp(M) ∩ (Vj ×Wj) = {(vsj , wsj )}. SinceM is perfect, no agent in P ∪ Q ∪ Z can be involved in a blocking pair ofM .
Now let cj be a clause in C (1 ≤ j ≤ m). Exactly one woman csj ∈ {c1j , c2j , c3j } has her last-choice partner in M . If
(x(csj ), c
s
j ) ∈ bp(M) then the literal occurring at position s of cj is false. In such a case we claim that the same is true for every
literal in cj. For, suppose not. Then there exists a true literal appearing at position s′ of cj. By construction of f , x(cs
′
j ) has his
first-choice partner inM . Let
M ′ = (M\((Pj ∪ Vj ∪ {qj})× (C ′ ∪W ∪ Z)))
∪{(qj, cs′j ), (ps′j , ws′j ), (vs′j , zj)} ∪ {(ptj , ctj ), (vtj , wtj ) : 1 ≤ t 6= s′ ≤ 3}.
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ThenM ′ is a perfect matching in I and |bp(M ′)| < |bp(M)|, contradicting the choice ofM . Hence the claim is established, so
that clause cj is false under f . It follows that |bp(M)| = n + m + (m − t(f )), and therefore t(B) + bp+(I) ≥ n + 2m. From
our earlier inequality it follows that t(B)+ bp+(I) = n+ 2m = 114 m, since 3m = 4n.
Berman et al. [4] show that it is NP-hard to distinguish between instances B of max (2,2)-e3-sat for which (i) t(B) ≥
(1− ε)m and (ii) t(B) ≤ ( 10151016 + ε)m. By our construction, it follows that in case (i), bp+(I) ≤ ( 35562032 + ε)m, whilst in case
(ii), bp+(I) ≥ ( 35582032 − ε)m. Hence an approximation algorithm for max size min bp (3, 3)-smi with performance guarantee
r , for any r ≤ 35573556+2032ε , could be used to decide between cases (i) and (ii) formax (2,2)-e3-sat in polynomial time, which is
a contradiction unless P= NP. 
Weremark that it is possible to prove Theorem7without requiring the agents in the setVj∪Wj∪{x6i+4, x6i+5, y6i+4, y6i+5 :
0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1}, however these agents are included in order to provide a single reduction that is also valid for max size min
ba smi. We now consider the approximability of this problem.
Theorem 8. Given any ε (0 < ε < 12032 ), max size min ba (3, 3)-smi is not approximable within
3557
3556+2032ε unless P= NP.
Proof. Let ε (0 < ε < 12032 ) be given. We use exactly the same reduction as in the proof of Theorem 7 and observe that each
blocking pair considered in that proof corresponds to two unique agents. It follows that 2t(B)+ba+(I) = 2(n+2m) = 11m2 ,
since 3m = 4n.
Berman et al. [4] show that it is NP-hard to distinguish between instances B of max (2,2)-e3-sat for which (i) t(B) ≥
(1− ε)m and (ii) t(B) ≤ ( 10151016 + ε)m. By our construction, it follows that in case (i), ba+(I) ≤ ( 35561016 + 2ε)m, whilst in case
(ii), ba+(I) ≥ ( 35581016 − 2ε)m. Hence an approximation algorithm formax size min ba (3, 3)-smiwith performance guarantee
r , for any r ≤ 35573556+2032ε , could be used to decide between cases (i) and (ii) formax (2,2)-e3-sat in polynomial time, which is
a contradiction unless P= NP. 
4. Preference lists on one side of length at most 2
We now consider instances of smi in which all preference lists on one side are of length at most 2. Let I be an smi instance
inwhichU is the set of men andW is the set of women. Assumewithout loss of generality that everyman has a list of length
at most 2. Let G be the underlying graph of I . Let n = |V (G)| andm = |E(G)|. Note thatm ≤ 2 · |U| < 2n.
Define perfectmin bp (p, q)-smi as follows. An instance of this problem is an smi instance I inwhich eachman’s preference
list is of length at most p and each woman’s preference list is of length at most q (p = ∞ or q = ∞ denotes unbounded
length preference lists as before). A solution is a perfectmatchingwith theminimumnumber of blocking pairs in I if I admits
a perfect matching, or ‘‘no’’ otherwise.
Lemma 9. perfect min bp (2,∞)-smi is solvable in O(n) time, where n is the number of men in I.
Proof. If |U| 6= |W | then the answer is no. Let I1 = I the initial instance. If there is a woman in I1 with an empty lists, then
we output ‘‘no’’. If there is a woman w1 with preference list that contains only one man, say m1 then w1 can be matched
only to m1 in a perfect matching. Therefore we add {w1,m1} to M , we remove w1 and m1 from I1 and obtain an instance
I2. We continue this process, if we find a woman in Ii with empty list then we stop the algorithm with output ‘‘no’’ and
if we find a woman wi with preference list of length 1 then we extend M with the pair (wi,mi) and reduce the instance
as described above. If for an instance Ik there is no woman with preference list of length at most one then every man and
womanmust have a preference list of length 2 in Ik, obviously. So the underlying graph of Ik consists of a set of disjoint even
cycles. Therefore, to achieve a perfect matchingwe can choose one from the two possible sets of edges for each of these even
cycles. We make these decisions for each even cycle separately after counting the blocking pairs that contain some women
in the cycle, for both cases, by considering all the edges of I . This last step can be done also in O(n) time since we have to go
through the women’s preference lists only once. 
We continue with the related problem men cover min bp (2,∞)-smi. Here, we suppose that the preference lists of the
men are of length at most 2, and the problem is to minimize the number of blocking pairs over all matchings that cover the
men.
Lemma 10. men cover min bp (2,∞)-smi is solvable in O(n2) time, where n is the number of men in I.
Proof. Suppose that the graph of the instance,G = (U∪W, E) is connected, otherwise, we can solve the problem separately
for each component. If the number of men |U| is greater than the number of women |W | then we output ‘‘no’’. If |U| = |W |
then we get an instance of perfect min bp (2,∞)-smi. The connectivity of G implies |W | ≤ |U| + 1, so the last possible
case is |W | = |U| + 1. Here, for everywj ∈ W we solve an instance Ij of perfect min bp (2,∞)-smi after removingwj from
the graph. Note that if a matching Mj is a minimum solution for Ij then Mj is also a minimum for I between the matchings
that does not cover wj, since in those matchings in I , where wj is not covered, every man in wj’s list has only one possible
partner. Therefore, we can get the optimal solution for I by solving |W | instances of perfect min bp (2,∞)-smi and choosing
the minimum of these solutions. 
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The problemwomen cover min bp (2,∞)-smi can be defined similarly. Here, we suppose that the preference lists of the
men are of length at most 2, and the problem is to minimize the number of blocking pairs over all matchings that cover the
women.
Lemma 11. women cover min bp (2,∞)-smi is solvable in O(n3) time, where n is the number of men in I.
Proof. Let G = (U ∪ W, E) be the graph of the instance I and let bp(M) denote the set of blocking pairs for a matching
M in I . If there is no such matching that covers W then we output ‘‘no’’. Otherwise, we deal only with such matchings in
this proof that covers W , so we assume this property hereby. Let bpint(M) denote the set of internal blocking pairs for M ,
those blocking pairs that are covered byM . Furthermore, let bpext(M) denote the external blocking pairs, where the men are
uncovered byM . Note that bp(M) = bpint(M) ∪ bpext(M).
Our algorithm consists of two cycles. In the first one, we eliminate the external blocking pairs without creating any new
internal blocking pair. In the second one, we try to reduce the number of internal blocking edges by switching pairs along
augmenting paths and cycles. Finally, we prove that if neither of these steps is possible then the solution is optimal.
Eliminating the external blocking pairs. Claim 1: Suppose that for a matching M, bpext(M) 6= ∅. We can construct a
matching M∗ such that |M| = |M∗| and bpint(M) ⊇ bpint(M∗) = bp(M∗).
Suppose that (ui, wj) ∈ bpext(M), and if (ui, wk) is also in bpext(M) then ui preferswj towk. LetM ′ = (M\{(M(wj), wj)})∪
{(ui, wj)}. We get bpint(M ′) ⊆ bpint(M) since only ui and wj could be part of a new internal blocking pair. This is because
(ui, wk) cannot be blocking since either ui prefers wj if (ui, wk) is blocking for M or (ui, wk) is not blocking for M , and wj
received a better partner so she cannot be part of any new blocking pair. Therefore, the set of internal blocking pairs can only
reduce. We keep doing this elimination process until obtaining a matchingM∗ such that bpint(M∗) = bp(M∗). This process
must terminate, since the women get better and better partners after each elimination, so no pair can be eliminated twice.
The final matchingM∗ satisfies the required condition.
In order to obtain the O(n) running time for the elimination process we have to ensure that we can find the external
blocking pairs efficiently. Here, we use the fact that if an uncoveredmen ul is not involved in any blocking pair for amatching
M then he cannot be part of a blocking pair for M ′ either, where M ′ is obtained after eliminating an external blocking pair
as described earlier. So we create a setN to collect such men that are uncovered byMk ∪ bpext(Mk), whereMk is the actual
matching in the process. Let N be empty for the initial matching. Whenever we consider an uncovered man ui /∈ N and
we find that ui does not involved in a blocking pair then we add ui to N . So in each step we either eliminate an external
blocking pair or we extendN untilN contains every uncovered men. Therefore, the process terminates in O(n) time.
Reducing the number of internal blocking pairs. Let the alternating path P and alternating cycle C be defined as
follows. For a matching M , a path P = {(u0, w1), (w1, u1), (u1, w2), . . . , (uk−1, wk), (wk, uk)} is an alternating path if
(wi, ui) ∈ M and (ui−1, wi) /∈ M for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k. If u0 = uk then we get an alternating cycle. Let M ⊕ P denote
the matching obtained by switching the edges along the alternating path, i.e. by removing the edges (ui, wi) from M and
adding (ui−1, wi) toM for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Furthermore, let PW and CW be the women covered by P and C , respectively, and
let PU = {u1, u2, . . . , uk} = M(PW ) and P0U = {u0, u1, . . . , uk−1} = (M ⊕ P)(PW ). Finally, let D(S) denote the set of edges
incident with the set of vertices S.
Claim 2: Suppose that for a matching M, bpext(M) = ∅. If there is an alternating path P such that |bpint(M ⊕ P) ∩
D(PW )| < |bpint(M) ∩ D(PW )| then |bpint(M ⊕ P)| < |bpint(M)|. Similarly, if there is an alternating cycle C such that
|bpint(M ⊕ C) ∩ D(CW )| < |bpint(M) ∩ D(CW )| then |bpint(M ⊕ C)| < |bpint(M)|.
It is enough to show that if wj /∈ PW then wj cannot be involved in any new internal blocking pair for M ⊕ P . Suppose
indirectly that (ui, wj) is a new internal blocking pair. If ui /∈ P0U then ui is either uncovered byM⊕P or has the same partner
as inM , so (ui, wj) cannot be a new internal blocking pair. If ui ∈ P0U∩ PU then (ui, wj) 6= E(G) since ui has only two women
in his list and both of them are in PW . Finally, if ui = u0 = P0U \ PU then (u0, wj) cannot be blocking since u0 was uncovered
byM and we supposed that no external blocking pair exists forM , a contradiction.
We show that the construction of all possible alternating paths and cycles together with counting the number of new
blocking pairs can be organized in O(n2) time. Considering the alternating paths, we build up these paths from every
uncovered man as follows. Let u be an uncovered men and w11 be the first woman in his lists. We generate the first set
of alternating paths starting from u as P1k (u) = {(u, w11), (w11, u11), (u11, w12), . . . , (u1k−1, w1k ), (w1k , u1k)} for every k while no
repetition occur in the sequence, by supposing that u1i = M(w1i ) andw1i is the other woman in u1i−1’s list besideM(u1i−1) for
every i ≤ k. We can generate P2k , the second set of alternating paths starting from u, similarly. When we count the number
of internal blocking pairs that are incident with the women of P1k (u) for the new matching M ⊕ P1k (u) we can use the fact
that for a womanw1i , the set of internal blocking pairs remains the same in thematchingsM⊕P1k (u) for every k > i and can
differ only by the pair (w1i ,m
1
i ) for k = 1 sincem1i is not covered inM ⊕ P1i (u). Therefore, to count the number of blocking
edges for every alternating paths P1k (u), we have to go through the preference lists of the women involved in the longest
such path only once. Considering the alternating cycles, we try to construct an alternating cycle from every covered vertex u
by building up the only alternating path starting from u as described above. If this alternating path returns toM(u) then we
find the only alternating cycle in which umay be involved, denoted by C(u). Then we simply count the number of internal
blocking pairs incident with the women involved in C(u) forM ⊕ C(u).
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The optimality. The next claim indicates that if neither of the above improvements is possible then the solution is
optimal.
Claim 3: Suppose that bpint(M) = bp(M) and there is a matching Mopt such that |bp(Mopt)| < |bp(M)|. Then there must
be either an alternating path P such that |bpint(M ⊕ P) ∩ D(PW )| < |bpint(M) ∩ D(PW )| or an alternating cycle C such that
|bpint(M ⊕ C) ∩ D(CW )| < |bpint(M) ∩ D(CW )|.
By Claim 1 we can suppose that bpint(Mopt) = bp(Mopt). Considering the symmetric difference of M and Mopt we get
some alternating paths, some alternating cycles and some pairs that remain matched in Mopt too. Let PW and CW denote
the set of women that are involved in an alternating path and an alternating cycle, respectively, and letRW denote the set
of women who get the same partner in M and Mopt . Furthermore, let PU = M(PW ), P 0U = Mopt(PW ), CU = M(CW ) and
RU = M(RW ). Finally, letDIF = CU ∪ (PU ∩ P 0U) denote the set of men who are matched with different partners inM
andMopt .
First we show that every women wj in RW must be involved in the same internal blocking pairs for M and Mopt . Let
us consider a pair (ui, wj). If ui ∈ RU then (ui, wj) is blocking for M if and only if it is blocking for Mopt too, obviously. If
ui ∈ DIF then (ui, wj) /∈ E(G) since ui has only two women in his list: M(ui) and Mopt(ui), who are in PW ∪ CW . Finally,
if ui ∈ P 0U \ PU then ui is uncovered by M , so (ui, wj) cannot be blocking since there is no external blocking pair for M .
Similarly, if ui ∈ PU \ P 0U then ui is uncovered by Mopt , so (ui, wj) cannot be blocking since there is no external blocking
pair forMopt .
Therefore, if we sum up the internal blocking pairs according the sets of women involved in the same alternating path
or in the same alternating cycle forM andMopt , then we get either an alternating path P or an alternating cycle C such that
either |bp(Mopt) ∩ D(PW )| < |bp(M) ∩ D(PW )| or |bp(Mopt) ∩ D(CW )| < |bp(M) ∩ D(CW )|.
If for an alternating path P , |bp(Mopt) ∩ D(PW )| < |bp(M) ∩ D(PW )| then we can prove that {bpint(M ⊕ P) ∩ D(PW )} ⊆
{bp(Mopt)∩D(PW )}which implies |bpint(M⊕P)∩D(PW )| < |bpint(M)∩D(PW )|. To verify this it is enough to show that if for
a womanwj ∈ PW , (ui, wj) is an internal blocking pair forM ⊕ P then (ui, wj) is an internal blocking pair forMopt too. Note
thatM⊕P(wj) = Mopt(wj), and ui is from the set of men covered byM⊕P that isM⊕P(W) = RU∪CU∪(PU \PU)∪P0U ⊆
RU ∪ P0U ∪ CU ∪ PU = (RU ∪ P0U) ∪ (DIF \ P0U) ∪ (PU \ P 0U). If ui ∈ RU or ui ∈ P0U then M ⊕ P(ui) = Mopt(ui), so
the statement is obvious. If ui ∈ DIF \ P0U then (ui, wj) /∈ E(G) since wj can be neither M ⊕ P(ui) = M(ui) nor Mopt(ui).
Finally, if ui ∈ PU \P 0U then ui is uncovered byMopt , so again, (ui, wj) cannot be blocking forM⊕P since there is no external
blocking pair forMopt .
Similarly, if for an alternating cycle C , |bp(Mopt) ∩ D(CW )| < |bp(M) ∩ D(CW )| then we can prove in the same way that
{bpint(M ⊕ C) ∩ D(CW )} ⊆ {bp(Mopt) ∩ D(CW )}which implies |bpint(M ⊕ C) ∩ D(CW )| < |bpint(M) ∩ D(CW )|.
Conclusion of the proof. If a matchingM is not optimal and there is no external blocking pair then Claim 3 implies that
we can find an alternating path or cycle that satisfies the condition described in Claim 2, so by switching the edges along
this path or the cycle the number of internal blocking pairs reduces.
The O(n3) time implementation of the complete algorithm can be obtained as follows. In the first phase of the algorithm
we eliminate the external blocking pairs inO(n) time as described in the proof of Claim1. If their is nomore external blocking
pair then we try to reduce the number of internal blocking pairs by switching pairs along augmenting paths and cycles as
described in Claim 2. This second phase can be done in O(n2) time, and after each run, either the number of internal blocking
edges reduces or we stop, since the solution was optimal. After the second phase we run the first phase again, since new
external blocking edges may have been created, and so on. We repeat the first and second phases at most |W | times, since
the number of internal blocking pairs for the initial matching is at most |W |. Therefore, we get O(n3) for the overall running
time of the algorithm. 
Theorem 12. max size min bp (2,∞)-smi is solvable in O(n3) time, where n is the number of men in I.
Proof. Let the bipartite graph be G = (U∪W, E), where every man inU has a preference list of length at most 2. First, we
decompose G by using König’s theorem. Let X ⊆ U and Y ⊆ W be such that X ∪ Y is a minimum vertex cover, whose size
is equal to the size of a maximummatching of G. LetM be a maximummatching that covers X ∪ Y . Note that there cannot
be an edge (x, y) inM with (x, y) ∈ (X × Y ).
LetU2 be a subset ofX such that for everyui ∈ U2 there is an alternating path fromsome y ∈ Y toui, and letW2 = M(U2).
Furthermore, letU3 = X \U2,U1 = U \ X ,W1 = Y andW3 = W \ (W1 ∪W2). We claim thatW1 ∪W2 ∪U3 is also a
minimum vertex cover, moreover, the component restricted to the set of verticesU1 ∪U2 ∪W1 ∪W2 is independent from
the component restricted to the set of verticesU3 ∪W3. The fact that (W1 ∪W2)×U3 does not contain any edge is obvious
by the definition ofU2. There is no edge betweenU1 andW3 since X ∪ Y is a vertex cover. Finally, for every man ui inU2,
both women in u′is list must be inW1 ∪W2 by the definition ofU2, so no woman in ui’s list can be fromW3.
Therefore, we can obtain the solution for instance I ofmax size min bp (2,∞)-smi by separately solving a problem ofmen
cover min bp (2,∞)-smi for the subinstance restricted toU3 ∪ W3 and a problem of women cover min bp (2,∞)-smi for
the subinstance restricted toU1 ∪U2 ∪W1 ∪W2. 
Further notes on the algorithm
We have seen in Section 3 that max size min bp (3, 3)-smi is NP-hard, whilst max size min bp (2,∞)-smi is solvable in
polynomial time using the above algorithm. The reader might wonder where the fact that the preference lists of one sex
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u1 : w1 w3 w2 w1 : u2 u1
u2 : w2 w1 w2 : u1 u5 u2
u3 : w3 w7 w4 w3 : u4 u1 u3
u4 : w4 w3 w4 : u3 u4
u5 : w5 w2 w6 w5 : u6 u5
u6 : w6 w5 w6 : u5 u6
u7 : w7 w8 w7 : u8 u3 u7
u8 : w8 w7 w8 : u7 u8
Fig. 6. Preference lists in an instance of max size min bp (3, 3)-smi.
are of length at most 2 is required in establishing the correctness of the algorithm for max size min bp (2,∞)-smi. Towards
addressing this issue, first we show that, interestingly, the first phase of our algorithm (eliminating the external blocking
pairs) works correctly for an arbitrary max size min bp smi instance as well. Claim 1 from our proof can be generalized as
follows.
Lemma 13. Suppose that we are given an instance I of max size min bp smi and a maximum matching M in I such that
bpext(M) 6= ∅. Then we can construct a maximum matching M∗ in O(m) time such that bpint(M) ⊇ bpint(M∗) = bp(M∗),
where m is the total length of the men’s preference lists in I.
Proof. First we note that M is a maximum matching, so no uncovered man and woman can be adjacent to each other,
therefore each external blocking pair must contain exactly one covered man (and one uncovered woman) or one covered
woman (and one uncovered woman). We refer to this as property P . We start with eliminating those external blocking
pairs which contain uncovered men. We consider these men one by one. When we take such an uncovered man ui, we
satisfy the blocking pair (ui, wj); this is the best blocking pair he is involved in according to his preferences. That is, we let
M ′ = (M \ {(M(wj), wj)}) ∪ {(ui, wj)}. It follows that bpint(M ′) ⊆ bpint(M), since only ui and wj could be part of a new
internal blocking pair, but ui does not form a blocking pair with anybody, and wj becomes better off in M ′, so she cannot
be involved in a new blocking pair either. We observe thatM ′ is also a maximummatching, and hence it is impossible that
M(wj) is adjacent to some woman who is unmatched inM ′. Therefore property P still holds.
Continuing this process we can eliminate every external blocking pair which involves an uncovered man in O(m) steps,
since the partner of some woman strictly improves whilst the others are unchanged. Moreover, we can implement this part
of the algorithm in O(m) time if, as in the (2,∞) case, we organize the search for the external blocking pair in a clever way
(that is, we use the same technique as described in the proof of Claim 1).
At the end of this step, with respect to the matching M ′ constructed, it is straightforward to verify that the following
property, which we refer to as property P ′, holds: M ′ admits no external blocking pair involving an uncovered man. After
this, we eliminate the rest of the external blocking pairs, each involving an uncovered woman, in the same manner. Again,
no new internal blocking pair will be created and we finish in O(m) time since no covered man can be worse off and one
covered man gets better off after each step. Moreover, we shall observe that we do not create any new external blocking
pair involving an uncovered man. This is because such a pair should consist of an uncovered man u and a woman w who
becameworse off in this process. But this means thatwmust have been uncovered as well in some interimmatching, which
is impossible, since eachmatchingwe deal with hasmaximum cardinality. Hence property P ′ holds, which implies that once
we have completed the steps in this paragraph, no external blocking pair remains. 
Given that the first phase of our algorithm extends to an arbitrary instance of max size min bp smi, the difficulty of
extending the whole approach to the general case lies within the second phase. Namely, in the (3, 3) case, it is possible that
we are not able to decrease the number of internal blocking pairs by switching edges along a single alternating path or cycle
but yet, the actualmatching is sub-optimal.We illustrate this factwith an instance ofmax sizemin bp (3, 3)-smi and a perfect
matchingM where no alternating cycle exists that would allow us to reduce the number of internal blocking pairs, but the
number of blocking pairs is not minimal.
Consider the max size min bp (3, 3)-smi instance shown in Fig. 6, and the matching: M = {(u1, w2), (u2, w1), (u3, w3),
(u4, w4), (u5, w6), (u6, w5), (u7, w7), (u8, w8)}. Here the only blocking pair is (u1, w3). We cannot eliminate this by
switching along any of the following four possible alternating cycles without creating a new blocking edge:
C1 = {(u1, w1), (w1, u2), (u2, w2), (w2, u1)}
C2 = {(u3, w4), (w4, u4), (u4, w3), (w3, u3)}
C3 = {(u5, w5), (w5, u6), (u6, w6), (w6, u5)}
C4 = {(u7, w8), (w8, u8), (u8, w7), (w7, u7)}.
However, we can reduce the number of internal blocking edges (and get a stable matchingM ′) if we switch edges along
two alternating cycles, namely C1 and C3 (or C2 and C4) simultaneously.
The crucial property of themax size min bp (2,∞)-smi instances that we use in our algorithm is the following. Regarding
the symmetric difference of any two matchings,M andM∗, if a womanw is involved in an alternating path or cycle C and a
man u is involved in a different alternating path or cycle C ′ then (u, w) cannot become an internal blocking pair if we switch
1840 P. Biró et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 411 (2010) 1828–1841
edges along either of C or C ′ only. This is simply because (u, w) does not exist if u is covered by both M and M∗ (see the
details in the proof of Claim 2). This means that we can separate the effect of edge-switching along disjoint paths or cycles,
therefore if matchingM∗ has a smaller number of internal blocking pairs thanM then wemust be able to find an alternating
path or cycle in their symmetric difference which allows us to decrease the number of internal blocking pairs starting from
M . This property does not hold for max size min bp (3, 3)-smi instances, as we demonstrated in the above example.
Adapting the algorithm for different models
In the case where the preference lists may include ties, we can use the same algorithm with the following minor
modification. When eliminating the external blocking pairs (Claim 1) we supposed that for an uncovered man ui, if both
(ui, wj) and (ui, wk) are external blocking pairs then ui preferswj towk. However in the case of ties, we require that ui either
preferswj towk or is indifferent between them.
Regarding the problem of minimizing the number of agents involved in blocking pairs, we need a little more care. In this
case too, we can eliminate every external blocking pair without creating any new internal blocking pair (Claim 1), therefore
we can focus on the number of agents involved in internal blocking pairs.
In the second phase of the algorithm, i.e., when we improve the solution by switching edges along augmenting paths
and cycles, we need to make the following changes. Instead of counting the internal blocking pairs, we now have to count
the agents involved in such pairs. Whenever we counted the internal blocking pairs that were incident with a set of women
X in the proof, here instead, we count the women in X who are involved in internal blocking pairs together with those
men with whom they form these internal blocking pairs. To be more precise, for a set of women X and a matching M , let
bmint(X,M) := {u ∈ U : ∃w ∈ X, (u, w) ∈ bpint(M)} (i.e., the set of men that form internal blocking pairs with some
woman from X). If baint(M) denotes the set of agents involved in internal blocking pairs for a matching M then Claim 2
should be modified as follows.
Claim 2′: Suppose that for a matching M, bpext(M) = ∅. If there is an alternating path P such that |baint(M ⊕ P) ∩
(PW ∪ bmint(PW , (M ⊕ P)))| < |baint(M) ∩ (PW ∪ bmint(PW ,M))| then |baint(M ⊕ P)| < |baint(M)|. Similarly, if there is
an alternating cycle C such that |baint(M ⊕ C) ∩ (CW ∪ bmint(CW , (M ⊕ C)))| < |baint(M) ∩ (CW ∪ bmint(CW ,M))| then
|baint(M ⊕ C)| < |baint(M)|.
Moreover, in the same way that we could obtain the number of internal blocking pairs by counting them according to
some partition of women, we can also obtain the number of agents involved in internal blocking pairs by counting them
according to the samepartition, since eachman canbe involved in atmost one internal blocking pair. Therefore, the following
modified version of Claim 3 can be proved in a similar way.
Claim 3′: Suppose that bpint(M) = bp(M) and there is a matching Mopt such that |ba(Mopt)| < |ba(M)|. Then there must be
either an alternating path P such that |baint(M ⊕ P)∩ (PW ∪ bmint(PW , (M ⊕ P)))| < |baint(M)∩ (PW ∪ bmint(PW ,M))| or an
alternating cycle C such that |baint(M ⊕ C) ∩ (CW ∪ bmint(CW , (M ⊕ C)))| < |baint(M) ∩ (CW ∪ bmint(CW ,M))|.
Using a similar modification as described in the first paragraph of this subsection, we can find a maximum matching
with the smallest number of blocking agents in the case that preference lists include ties. The running time of thesemodified
algorithms remainsO(n3), since having ties in the lists does not require any significantmodification, and counting the agents
involved in blocking pairs is not harder than counting the blocking pairs themselves.
Let max size min ba (2,∞)-smi be the problem of finding a maximum matching with the smallest number of blocking
agents for the case where the lists on one side are of length at most 2, and let max size min bp (2,∞)-smti (respectively
max size min ba (2,∞)-smti) be the problem of finding a maximum matching with the smallest number of blocking pairs
(respectively blocking agents) for the case where the preference lists on one side are of length at most 2 and ties may occur
in the lists on either side. We summarize our results in the following theorem.
Theorem 14. max size min bp (2,∞)-smti,max size min ba (2,∞)-smi andmax size min ba (2,∞)-smti are solvable in O(n3)
time, where n is the number of men in I.
5. Concluding remarks
In Table 1we summarize complexity results for problems involving finding stablematchings and findingmatchings with
the minimum number of blocking pairs or blocking agents, in the context of instances of smi and sr. The table is split into
columns according to these problems, and further according to whether the preference lists are strictly ordered or include
ties.
The rows of the table refer to the case that we seek either a stable matching, or a matching with the minimum number
of blocking pairs, or a matching with the minimum number of blocking agents; these rows are further split into the cases
that the matching should be of arbitrary or maximum size.
In a given table entry, ‘P’ denotes that the problem in question is polynomial-time solvable, whilst ‘N’ denotes NP-
hardness. Furthermore, ‘= 0’ denotes the fact that an optimal solution admits 0 blocking pairs, whilst ‘(*)’ indicates that
the complexity result is established in this paper. The arrows indicate that NP-hardness holds by restriction, given the result
in the cell above / to the left / above-left as appropriate.
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Table 1
Complexity results for problems involving finding stable matchings and matchings with the minimum number of blocking pairs/agents.
The problem is to find a matchingM WhereM is smi instances sr instances
Strict With ties Strict With ties
Such thatM Arbitrary P[6] P [6,8] P [11] N [20,14]
is stable Maximum P[6,7] N [17] P[11,8] N [20,14]
Such thatM has the minimum Arbitrary P (=0) [6] P (=0) [6,8] N [2]a N (←)
number of blocking pairs Maximum N (∗) N (←) N (↑) N (↖)
Such thatM has the minimum Arbitrary P (=0) [6] P (=0) [6,8] N [2]b N (←)
number of blocking agents Maximum N (∗) N (←) N (↑) N (↖)
a This result holds even if all preference lists are complete.
b It may be verified that a straightforward modification of Theorem 1 in [2] establishes the NP-hardness of the problem of finding a matching with the
minimum number of blocking agents, given an instance of srwhere all preference lists are complete; we omit the details for space reasons.
Subsequently to the submission of this paper, Hamada et al. [10] strengthened Theorem 7 by giving a reduction that
builds on that contained in the proof of Theorem 1 in order to show that max size min bp (3, 3)-smi is not approximable
within n1−ε , for any ε > 0, where n is the number of men.
We conclude with some open problems. The hardness results of Sections 2 and 3 also apply in the cases of hr and its
generalization hrt, where preference lists may include ties. However it remains to extend the algorithms of Section 4 to
either of these settings, or to show that the corresponding optimization problems are NP-hard.
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